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THE FUTURE LEGAL PRACTITIONER IN THE
UNITED STATES: WHAT TRAINING

HE MUST RECEIVE
By ROBERT B. YEGGE*
B

EFORE discussing some of the specific issues which Dr. Moore
has outlined for us in terms of their relevance for legal structure, and hence for the legal curriculum of the future, I would like
to remind him of some remarks he made at another time and place.
I am not so sure that we could not substitute the word "lawyers"
for the words "social scientists" in the following quote from Professor Moore's presidential address to the American Sociological
Association last year:
Have we, in short, any obligations as social scientists [lawyers]
to start taking account, not only of the changeful quality of social
life but also of the fact that some portion of that change is deliberate? Do we, still as social scientists, [lawyers] have anything
positive to add to the fulfillment of human hopes for the future,
or are we always fated to counsel the eager traveler that "you can't
get there from here"?'

I would suggest that as professionals charged with knowing and
teaching about the nature of order in our society, we lawmen do
know that a portion of change is deliberate, and we cannot and will
not counsel that there are no answers to the problems involved.
I.
An insightful paper by Wendell Bell and James A. Mau of
Yale University entitled "The Future as the Cause of the Present" 2
emphasizes that the future can be studied scientifically, taking due
account of the past and present. A point made by these scholars is
that a major contemporary theme is "the rise of human mastery."
Professor Moore commented on this when he said:
The art of prophecy, if it is to rest on scientific procedures
rather than supernatural inspiration, requires some rather well-machined parts put together in a sensible order. To foretell the future,
we should want first to identify probably persistent components of
the present.*Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; A.B., Princeton
University, 1956; M.A., University of Denver, 1958; LL.B., University of Denver,
1959.
1 Moore, The Utility of Utopias, 31 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 765 (1966).
2

W. Bell & J. Mau, The Future as the Cause of the Present, 1967 (mimeo.).

3 W. MOORE,THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY 111 '(1965).
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The study of precedent - decisions made in the past - will
remain an important emphasis in legal training. However, to the
study of precedent will be added a systematic and empirical analysis
of present structures, formal and informal, which govern and guide
legal relationships. Prediction rests upon certain assumptions, as
Professor Moore points out. First, it must be assumed that there
will be a measure of order. Second, it must also be assumed that
there will be survival of the system. "If chaos rules, prophecy cannot, or for that matter, man, survive. 4 This is all to say that the
law school cannot merely acknowledge the impact of change. Change
is ubiquitous; it is pervasive; it is increasing in rate and effect. The
law is now charged with the responsibility of thinking in a new
dimension - that of the future. The charge is a difficult one, for
the law must maintain order in the face of rapid change.
In discussing human involvement in social change, Bell and
Mau record the following accurate summary of the context in which
contemporary change is taking place.
"

The theory of social change discussed in this paper rests upon
the assumption that a major trend of history has been an objective
increase in the mastery of man over his environment as well as a
shift in his beliefs that this is so. An implication of this is that
explanations of social change are only more or less relevant to the
events of particular epochs, depending upon how accurate the explanation is in assessing and taking into account the amount of influence man himself may have, and thinks he has, in directing social
change. For example, ecological explanations may be of considerable
relevance to the behavior of primitive man, since primitive man's
chief struggle was against nature, and his life was shaped by that
struggle. Ends were seldom questioned and means were often invested with ritualistic significance. Possibly the gods could be persuaded to bring about a desired future event, but fatalism was widespread. Likewise, explanations based on notions of economic determinism or technology, rather than ecology, had considerable relevance for industrializing men and societies of the 17th, 18th and
19th centuries. Ends or goals were still largely unquestioned and
clearly defined, but means were increasingly free from religious
dogma to be chosen according to criteria of efficiency and economy.
Today, traditional ecological and technological explanations are no
longer of primary importance in explaining the behavior of men in
advanced societies, because in such societies man's chief struggle is
with himself and other men, not with nature or the lack of technology, and because both the ends and means of life have been
increasingly freed for man to choose consciously. This freedom has
been made possible by securing the essentials and amenities of life
for most people in advanced societies while creating relatively short
hours of productive labor and by advances in philosophy and science,
including sociology, that have reduced people's dependence upon
superstition and fatalistic conceptions of the future. Of course, this
freedom to select both goals and ways of achieving them, which
permits some individuals and groups to establish new norms and
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values for entire societies, occurs in a context of certain limiting
agreed-upon principles of group survival which are seldom extensively violated. Nonetheless, the latitude of decision is quite large.
Large enough, for example, to bring new burdens to modern man,
especially the burden of knowing both that his life and environment
will become what he will make of them and that he is not always
certain just what he wants, or should want, to make of them. Thus
in the most advanced societies, even structural explanations lose
much of their compelling relevance and give way to the dominance
of moral explanations. But the latter represent a new, secular
morality, which is pragmatic and open to social choice and universal
consideration. Thus, for modern man, life becomes a journey
through time toward a better future that is represented by a series
of emergent destinations, each one containing some features that
appear more desirable than those of the prescnt but also containing
surprises and uncertainties. One surprise is that usually any destination once reached, is simply a way station to another, the ability
to envision some better, more distant
time or place, being both the
5
blessing and curse of modern man.
We might say that we are living in an era of self-fulfilling
prophecy. As Bell and Mau have observed, man has control of his
destiny more than ever before. His actions will determine the shape
of the future to an ever greater extent in more and more areas.
A. History
From a knowledge of his past man can make plans for the ordering of his behavior in the future; and this he has done. Unfortunately, in the law, he has institutionalized reliance on the past. And
such unilateral dependence can produce strange distortions as emphasized in the following bit of poor, but frightening, poetic philosophy found in the Colorado case of Van Kleeck v. Ramer:"
One day through the primeval wood
a calf walked home as good calves should;
But left a trail all bent askew,
a crooked trail, as all calves do.
Since then, three hundred years have fled,
and I infer, the calf is dead.
But still he left behind this trail,
and thereby hangs my moral tale.
The trail was taken up next day by
a lone dog that passed that way;
And then a wise bell-wether sheep pursued
the trail o'er vale and steep,
And drew the flock behind him, too,
as good bell-wethers always do.
So from that day, o'er hill and glade,
through those old woods a path was made,
W. Bell & J. Mau, supra note 2, at 7-9.
662 Colo. 4, 44, 156 P. 1108, 1121 (1916).
5
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And many men wound in and out,
and bent and turned and dodged about,
And uttered words of righteous wrath,
because 'twas such a crooked path;
But still they followed - do not laugh
the first migrations of that calf,
And through this winding woodway stalked
because he wobbled when he walked.
This forest path became a lane,
that bent and turned and turned ag'in;
This crooked lane became a road,
where many a poor horse, with his load,
Toiled on, beneath the burning sun,
and traveled some three miles in one.
And thus a century and a half they trod
the footsteps of that calf.
The years passed on with swiftness fleet,
the road became a village street,
And this, before men were aware,
a city's crowded thoroughfare.
And soon the central street was this
of a renowned metropolis.
And men two centuries and a half
trod the footsteps of that calf.
Each day a hundred thousand rout
followed the zigzag calf about;
And o'er his crooked journey went the
traffic of a continent.
A hundred thousand men were led by
one calf near three centuries dead.
They followed still his crooked way,
and lost one hundred years a day;
For thus such reverence is lent to
well-established precedent.
A moral lesson this might teach
were I ordained and called to preach.
For men are prone to go it blind
along the calf-path of the mind,
And toil away from sun to sun to do
what other men have done.
They follow in the beaten track,
and out and in, and forth and back,
And still their devious course pursue
to keep the path that others do.
But how the wise old wood-gods laugh,
who saw the first primeval calf!
Ah! many things this tale might teach;
But I am not ordained to preach.

B. Science and Technology
Man's technology has determined many of his destinies. And
Legal
institutions can retard or implement scientific progress; but science
the law inevitably gets involved in science and technology.
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continues to provide new problems for the law. We need to know
more about the effects of the legal rules on scientific invention, exploration, and innovation. We need to determine whether these
rules channel application of the new developments into broad benefits for the society. Mark Massel, one of our seminar leaders, has
observed:
There are many indications of these interplays. Tort and insurance law influence the establishment of atomic energy plants as well
as the development of safety devices in factories and in automotive
design. Employee contracts may govern innovation through their
control of patents and shop rights. Provisions in government procurement contracts can affect invention and innovation through their
power over patent rights, investment risks, and limitations of security. Antitrust laws can sway research and innovation, including
changes in methods of distribution. The control of the radio spectrum can encourage or discourage innovation in television and radio.
Health and safety standards can affect many types of research and
can compel progress in the control of water and air pollution.
Criminal law has a bearing on a life and physical science complex,
including psychiatry, lie detection, and electronic eavesdropping.
On the other hand, scientific development can affect various
elements in the legal system. Improvements in the use of the radio
spectrum may permit a considerable increase in the number of
broadcasting stations and lessen the importance of licensing and
controls. Progress in the life sciences may increase the scope of
tort liabilities through new methods of proving damages incurred
from sustained cigarette use and radium poisoning. Techniques for
capturing various resources of the sea will lead to substantial changes
in maritime and international law. More effective means of controlling pollution will promote direct regulation and probably influence torts and contract law. Further development of electronic
devices and computer technology may 7create new legal problems
regarding the privacy of the individual.
C. Humanities
The humanities, too, have an important stake in the deliberate
and purposeful future planning which man can do and is doing.
Frederick L. Polak has observed:
In setting himself purposefully to control and alter the course
of events, man has been forced to deal with the concepts of value,
means and ends, ideals and ideologies, as he has attempted to blueprint his own future. As long as the prophet-propitiator was acting
only as a divine transmitter of messages from on high, man felt
that he was accepting his ethics ready-made, with no alterations
allowed. In a later stage man staggers under the double load of
not only having to construct his own future but having to create
the values which will determine its design. 8
Polak's observations are particularly relevant for law. Law is
about values. In order to construct or "design" a legal blueprint
Massel, Legal Institutions in a Changing Society: The Need For Appraisal, 1967
(lecture, mimeo.).
8 F. POLAK, THE IMAGE OF THE FUTURE: ENLIGHTENING THE PAST, ORIENTING THE
7M.

PRESENT, FORECASTING THE FUTURE 36-37 (1961).
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for the future, value questions, on which the humanists are experts,
must be solved.
For example, the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor9 gave
the lawyer's work product a qualified immunity from discovery.
The legal and historical basis for, and the actual practice under,
the rule has been widely debated. Courts have issued many divergent
opinions about specific applications of the rule. Glaser has pointed
out: "Plainly no survey of attorneys can decide whether work product should be discoverable, what documents ought to be considered
work product, and the conditions justifying their discovery. These
are policy decisions depending on the rule-maker's values and his
estimates of the probable consequences for litigation resulting from
each possible rule."1 The value content of the education of a potential rule-maker is critical to the orderly development of law.
We must get there from here. Lawmen, probably more than
any other single occupational group, affect decision-making beginning at high policy levels in our government right down through
the decisions which may affect the course of dealings between neighbors. As decision-makers, lawmen have some notion about the future.
Accordingly, they must be aware of the structure - present and
future - of their society. They must be aware of the solutions of
the past; they must be aware of the developing technology; and they
must be able to assess, in terms of values and goals, the factual knowledge that is available to them. Accordingly, this conference on
liberalization of the law school curriculum focuses on how the fields
of history, science and technology, social science, and philosophy
may find their way into legal study.
II.
Let us now examine the specific subject: "The Future Legal
Practitioner in the United States: What Training He Must Receive."
Necessarily we must draw on Professor Moore's analysis of the
"Changes in American Social Structure." I suggest also that we must
draw on those persistent elements of the future just discussed.
Dr. Moore traces some themes of change which are clearly
observable in changing legal practice. Occupational specialization
is conspicuous in legal practice. Almost every lawyer has a specialty.
Look around. There are trial lawyers and office lawyers. Generally,
the office lawyer brings in a trial man when an occasional case
reaches the courthouse steps. A trial lawyer relies on his office
p329 U.S. 495 (1947).
10 W. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary System, at vii-7, 1966 (mimeo.).
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counterpart to handle strictly office matters. Some of the specialization is by exclusion. It is usual, if not general, that even the "general
practitioner" has certain areas in which he will not practice, notably
domestic relations and criminal law. With the exponential growth
of law and legal principles, it becomes increasingly difficult for one
to be an effective "general practitioner." Indeed, for the protection
of the public, specialized training would seem to be demanded. The
fact of specialization follows in part from the explosion of knowledge in areas such as science and technology where the legal principles have grown, multiplied and become more specific at an extremely rapid rate. With the intricacies of American life, not only
is specialization in knowledge of the law required but specialization
in knowledge about the field which the law covers is frequently
demanded of legal counselors. Accordingly, it is increasingly important that the lawyer know not only the law of a certain field but
the subject matter as well.
Specialization raises some serious value questions. To a certain
extent, specialization protects one from a moral obligation. It is
more comfortable to draw away and be protected from large policy
questions by announcing your technical expertise. If it be true that
"humanity is overcome by competence," then the lawyer's obligation
to understand the place of his specialty in the larger value structure
of his community and society is intensified.
Lawyers have become ecologically redistributed. Recent figures
clearly show that the number of lawyers in rural communities is
diminishing, a trend which is offset by the growing number of lawyers in urban areas. This observation is merely a replication of ecological redistribution in most fields of endeavor. The redistribution
of lawyers has had its organizationalimplications as well. Bureaucratization and growth in size of legal practice units is clearly observable. At the same time, the need for legal services is becoming
more and more centralized. Thus, with some obvious exceptions,
the practice of law is becoming increasingly collective. On the one
hand, there is in-house practice for an established organization and
on the other hand there is an increase in the size and number of law
firms. Business, political, social, and legal aid organizations are
realizing the need for in-house counsel Legal departments and legal
staffs in non-legal organizations increase daily. Each year the number and size of law firms are increasing. To hang out one's shingle
is becoming increasingly difficult. As in clinical medicine, a team
of legal advisors is increasingly used. In fact, economic facts today
indicate that lawyers in large firms who specialize earn more than
the lone practitioner, and hence the pressures toward collectivity are
intensified. As Moore has observed, decisions at the legal practice
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level are becoming increasingly "collective." And in this process,
as one exercises collective judgment, the need for examination of
underlying values is further increased.
Another manifestation of specialization follows Moore's charge
that participation by a larger number of persons in society in available services is imminent. This increase in demands will also apply
to legal services.
Lawyers have many incompetencies. There are sub-professionals,
not lawyers, who can handle certain legally related problems with
efficiency at least equal to that of lawyers. And the services of these
para-legal people are more available to the society than are the
services of the legal fraternity. The title insurance companies competently prepare title opinions in the form of title commitments.
Insurance adjusters are experts in negotiation and settlement. Professional estate planners have in-depth knowledge of tax and legal
rules and regulations, and they give sound advice. In fact, some of
these sub-professional specialists have greater competence in their
areas than do many general legal practitioners. Clearly, a larger base
of the population has access to these para-legal people than to the
professional lawman.
It is curious and unfortunate that few people enter the law with
a "calling." This lack of calling is a function of non-interest of the
lawyer in broad policy questions. With the exception of some stouthearted and much-to-be-admired public servants, the lawyer goes to
the law to make money. In law school he dreams of being a corporate lawyer so that he can manipulate dollars and solve the commercial problems of his clients. No wonder, then, that the organized
bar meets the pressing need for para-legal assistance for a large
share of the population with subjective negativism. If "equality"
before the law is to be recognized, we have a major manpower
shortage. There are not enough lawyers to go around for all the
services ultimately demanded. It has been observed that a mere
three hours more of legal service per year for each of the nation's
55 million families would require 40 percent more lawyers in the
United States. Clearly, something has to give. "If you don't serve
the public as it needs to be served," warned ABA President Kuhn,
"the public will force some kind of change in the profession.""
Development of para-legal professions is predestined.
Our medical brethren early recognized the importance of a
para-medical professional: the nurse. They incorporated the training of these para-medical people into the medical school curriculum.
Now, I am told, American medical education is examining the con" TIME,

Aug. 20, 1965.
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tent of this indispensable training. Legal education has not even
recognized the parallel problem. Yet, if we are to meet the predicted equality and meet the challenge of increased participation by
all members of society, the law school must take steps at least to
study potential training of para-legal occupational aspirants or, alternatively, we will see this function assumed by other, more socially
concerned institutions.
Indeed pluralism is a major contemporary theme and promises
to be even more important in the future. The law has, in a certain
sense, tolerated demands for equality. But the evidence shows that
we may be at a point of disengagement. Attorney General Katzenbach, at the American Bar Association Convention in 1965, reported:
Too often the poor see the law as something which garnishes
his salary, which repossesses his refrigerator, which evicts him from
his house, which channels his welfare, which binds him to usury,
which deprives him of his liberty because he cannot afford bail.
Small wonder, then, that the poor man does not respect the law. 12
In the arena of science and technology, the law school must
realize that the quilled pen has become obsolete. Whether lawyers
like it or not, the computer has and will continue to refine the West
Digest System and Shepard's Citations. As Shepherd S. Bailey, Jr.,
Director of the Princeton University Library, has observed:
The combination of the computer with remote copying technology will make some types of publications obsolete, such as
scholarly journals, symposia, and certain kinds of reference works.
It will be necessary to publish only the indices, perhaps with summaries or digests, and the wanted article can be transmitted on
demand from a central station. 13
Technology poses at least two questions for legal education.
On one level, what are we doing about exploring the applications
of this technology to legal education? If it is true that a basic purpose of law school is to teach the potential lawyer "how to find the
law," what is going to happen when technology intervenes in the
law library, which should be soon? At another level, what are we
teaching our students about the uniquely new concept that a publisher may be selling not a book, but an image of a book which,
unlike the traditional paper cloth-bound version, is easily reproduced
in violation of copyrights?
Moore has observed that not only is bureaucracy here to stay,
but that bureaucracies encourage a "kind of rule-making posture."
Indeed, legal systems are manufactured and perpetuated in a bureaucratic organization. The private legal system developed by the bureaucracy is carried out through thorough empirical research of behavior,
12Id.
13SCHOLARLY

BooKs

iN AMERICA, Oct. 1966.
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not through uncoordinated accumulated experience. In a similar
manner, as Moore has observed, the contemporary executive empirically, carefully, and objectively examines facts (many generated
from his "research and development" department) in making decisions. The lawman has been involved in the creation of private
systems of law and in the decision-making processes of the bureaucracy in the past. But it is doubtful that the present legal curriculum
is teaching him the methodologies for dealing with the new facts
of science and technology which are necessary for today's professional advice. The lawyer's education has developed his sense of
"common sense" but has not encouraged systematic observation of
facts. The knowledge and methodologies of other disciplines, notably the behavioral sciences, are critical to the development of systems of looking at facts.
The future and, for that matter, the present practitioner of law
in the United States has many gaps in his training. Notably, the
gaps are due to an insulation from reality through an educational
experience which unduly emphasizes the study of precedent.
As David Riesman observed in his talk to the Harvard Law
School Sesquicentennial recently:
"Research" in the sense of empirical investigation into the
impact of law and lawyer - the intricate two-way traffic between
law and social subgroups - is only beginning; it is demanding, and
nobody quite knows how to do it, but several people may perhaps
do better than a single person if they bring disparate methodologies
to the enterprise.... The amateurism of the law professor, the
fact that he is a layman in terms of social science methods and their
intricacies stands him in good stead, in warding off the call of the
guilds and in heeding the call of the problems of the future. Yet,
as I am sure many law professors do realize, there is a great danger

in being too cavalier, too amateur, about the methodological problems within the central social sciences. This is evident in the use
of the term "behavioral science" for some of the law sponsored
ventures, and it is evident in some of the more interesting volumes
of cases and materials which lumped together snippets from psy-

chology, sociology, political science or philosophy without giving
the law student any sense of the different languages of these breeds
of men, or the intramural problems
of knowing whether what
14
seems plausible is actually

so.

III.
All is not discouraging in the current curriculum of the law
school. A most encouraging sign is that the law schools are beginning to think of problems in functional rather than categorical terms.
Thus, we are developing courses in "poverty law" and "urban problems" rather than sticking to the traditional categories of torts, contracts, property, et cetera. The categorical approach necessarily limits
14 Harvard Law School Sesquicentennial, Sept. 23, 1967.
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the considerations which the subject may encompass. The functional
approach, on the other hand, forces the professor and the student
to see the many faces of a problem, not all strictly legal. I might
suggest that a way of "liberalizing" the law curriculum (and by
liberalizing I mean introducing the accumulated wisdom of clearly
related fields) would be to restructure more of our courses on functional lines. We must all chuckle at the Lord Chancellor in Iolanthe
when he announced to a group of fellow peers that:
The Law is the true embodiment

Of everything that is excellent
It has no kind of fault or flaw
And I, my Lords, embody the law.

Allow me to outline, functionally, a problem not frequently
considered by the law because it cannot be found in any of the traditional categories. By approaching the problem functionally, the need
for legal development becomes obvious.
In contrast to younger people, the older person typically has
poor health and low energy; his educational background is comparatively inadequate and out-of-date; he is often deprived of his occupational role; his earnings are cut off, and he is left on a fixed retirement income in the face of rising living standards and declining
value of the dollar; he is cut off from the family group as his children leave home, his spouse ultimately dies, and he is left to live alone.
Particularly in the face of advanced technology, the implications of poor health and low energy, as well as inadeqate and outof-date educational background, are profoundly relevant for the law.
Quite candidly, it is dangerous to allow the elderly person to operate
that monster of death and destruction, the automobile. The law has
recognized arbitrarily that minors are incompetent to perform certain
acts. Is it not possible that adult "majors" are similarly incompetent?
As with minors, the elderly have difficulty living alone. The law
states that minors are dependent and support is decreed. Might
it be similarly true that "majors," unable to maintain themselves
and likely to become public charges, should be supported by a
responsible relative?
The educational levels of the elderly are inferior and clearly
less adequate. Statistics on the education of lawyers make it unfortunately clear that very few elderly lawyers completed undergraduate
education and a large number of them did not even attend law
school. Should lawyers be licensed to practice their professional
occupation for only a limited period of time and, indeed, should not
all persons be re-examined from time to time on the currency of their
knowledge?
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The social sciences have given us some facts about "majors";
science and technology has created some serious problems for "majors"; we are aware that the value systems of older people are rich
and deep. What has the legal system to say about elderly society?
Anything? Shouldn't it?
IV.
It seems clear: We can get there from here. But we can't do
it alone.

